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Abstract
Starting from the Minority Game and building more and more sophisticated models
of adaptive agents, we show that minority mechanisms underly any model where
agents learn collectively a resource level that can be either obvious and constant in
time, obvious and time-varying, or hidden.
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Six years after its introduction, the Minority Game [1] is understood as a model
of competition for limited resource. Many extensions of the original model
have been introduced [2]. remarkably, most of them contain a phenomenology
which, while being partly idiosyncratic, has close similarities with that of the
original MG. This is also true of models which relax the symmetry between
the two choices, such as the El Farol bar problem [3,4,5] and an asset pricing
model [6]. This also suggests that the original MG belongs to a broader class of
models. For instance, the minority game (MG) was introduced as a simplified,
binary version of the El Farol Bar problem (EFBP) [3]. Extending methods
and results for the MG allowed recently the understanding of the EFBP [5].
This raises two questions: what is these class of models, and how far can the
methods used for the MG be extended to more general models.
Let us start from the MG, which is defined as follows: there are two choices,
labelled by −1 and +1; at each time step, agent i (i = 1, · · · , N) takes the
choice ai(t). Then he receives the payoff
− ai(t)A(t) (1)
where A =
∑N
i=1 ai(t) is the aggregate outcome. He is therefore rewarded if he
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happened to be in the minority. The structure of a minority payoff is clearly
made up of a − sign and a product of the individual action and the aggregate
action. When the agent possess strategies and associated cumulated scores,
they are able to learn and adapt to their environment (see the original paper
[1]. Many interesting issues and very rich behaviour were studied extensively
in the past, and we shall refer the interested reader to previous work [2].
In the MG, the number of winners is at most N/2, which fixes the resource
level L at N/2. There is a priori no reason why L should be fixed to N/2,
except symmetry and simplicity. But a game with L 6= N/2 cannot reasonably
be called a minority game: it is rather closer to an El Farol Bar problem. On
the other hand, it is rather obvious that a common and essential mechanism
is at work whatever L, which is called a minority mechanism in the following.
Recognizing this allows the extension of the extensive literature on the MG
to such games.
The El Farol bar makes N = 100 agents compete for L = 60 seats. The
economics literature has tried for many years now to try to understand why the
average number of adaptive agents in the bar fluctuates around the resource
level [7,8]. In this problem, the (linear) payoff of agent i is
− ai(t)[A(t)−K] (2)
where K = |N − 2L|. The average attendance is equal to the resource level
if 〈A〉 = K. In the MG, K = 0, 〈A〉 = 0 by construction. It turns out
that 〈A〉 = K provided that the strategy space is ‘consistent’ 1 , which is the
case in Arthur’s paper. Therefore, EFB is rigorously equivalent to MG. As a
consequence, all the MG literature’s analysis of fluctuations and predictability
in the MG applies directly to the EFBP. Reversely, this explains why the
phenomenology of the asset model [6] is remarkably similar to that of the
MG: in this model, N agents try to discover the true value of an asset by
buying and selling it, having only incomplete information. On the other hand,
this result also implies that that a game with K 6= 0 (or L 6= N/2) where
the agents have binary strategies drawn in a non-biased way is not equivalent
to a EFBP; accordingly, these models tend actually to study the by-products
of strategy inconsistency whose effect is particularly dramatic with binary
strategies.
This makes it possible to compute the phase diagram of the EFBP when the
agents based their decisions on previous M (binary) attendances, as in the
original EFPB: for perfect strategy consistency (the γ = 0 vertical line in
Fig 1), 〈A〉 = K. This plot illustrate the subtlety of the convergence of the
1 More precisely, a strategy space is consistent if N〈a〉a = K where 〈a〉a denotes
the average decision over the strategy space. See Ref. [5] for more details.
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Fig. 1. Phase diagram of the El Farol Bar problem and of Minority games with
biased strategies. γ measures the bias between the average element of the strategy
space and the resource level.
attendance to the resource level: when N is small compared with P (upper
part of the plot), a infinitesimal strategy inconsistency is enough to take 〈A〉
away from K. On the other hand, then N is large enough, there is a region
such that 〈A〉 = K. It is however bounded: if γ > 1/√pi, no matter how many
agents are in the game, the attendance never converges to the resource level.
The resource level L can also vary in time. Instead of designing an ad hocmech-
anism that changes L according to some rule, be it deterministic or stochastic,
but arbitrary nonetheless, let us consider commodity markets, or equivalently
global ultimatum games [9] that perfectly show how minority mechanisms
emerge when a group of players learn collectively a resource level. In a stan-
dard ultimatum game [10], some generous but perverse donor proposes 1$ to
player 1, to be shared with player 2, provided that player 2 accepts the share
offered by player 1. Rationality dictates that player 2 should accept any pro-
posal, because otherwise he does not receive anything at all. But experiences
show that a human player is not likely to propose, nor to accept an arbitrarily
low proposal of player i, as they are not perceived as fair [11]. Mathematically,
player 1 proposes a and player 2 expects at least b. Then player 1’s payoff is
(1− a)Θ(a− b) (3)
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and the one of player 2 is
aΘ(a− b) (4)
where Θ(x) = 1 if x > 0 and 0 otherwise. Suppose now that there is a group of
NA people who have to share NA$ and a group of NB people who each expect
to have a given amount of money. Mathematically, player i of group A offers
ai, while player j of group B expects at least bj . The offers and expectations
are grouped into
A =
NA∑
i=1
ai and B =
NB∑
j=1
bj . (5)
Then a transaction takes place if A > B. In that case, player i of group A
receives ai(NA−A)/NA, and player j of group B receives biB/NB. Consider the
very likely situation where A 6= B. Two types of player can be distinguished:
those who want to see A and B converge, and those who try to make them
diverge. The nice players of group A have therefore a payoff that rewards small
a if A > B and large a if A < B; conversely for group-B players, for instance,
player i of group A rewards decision ai according to
(1− ai)Θ(A− B) + ai(1−Θ(A−B)) = ai[1− 2Θ(A−B)] + Θ(A−B)(6)
Linearising this payoff gives −ai(A−B)+ (A−B). Now, if player i has S > 1
strategies ai,1, · · · , ai,S, he will use them according to the difference between
their cumulated payoffs. We can therefore drop the last term (A − B); we
conclude that strategies are rewarded according to
− ai,s(A−B) s = 1, · · · , S (7)
Similarly, player j of group B rewards his strategies with −bi,s(B − A). This
is nothing else than a minority mechanism with resource level B (see Eq
(2)). Therefore, B is the resource level of the A group, and A is the resource
level of the B group: commodity markets are two coupled minority games,
whose resource levels vary in time. The fact that each group plays internally
a minority game means that the players of a given group compete with each
other. For instance, in group A, each agent has incentive to lower his offer,
hoping that his fellows will be generous enough to ensure that A > B. But if
his fellows offer too little, he has better to offer more. Exact results of EFPB
are readily extended to models with this kind of payoff.
A final example of well hidden minority mechanism is provided by credit risk
models where N banks have lent money to a given company [12]. The dynamics
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of the wealth W of the latter is assumed to evolve according to
W (t+ 1)
W (t)
= 1 + ∆(t)− B(t)
W (t)
(8)
where ∆(t) is the difference of relative wealth due to the activity of the com-
pany 2 and B(t) is the cost of the company’s debt. More precisely, if bank i lent
ci and asks an interest rate of ri(t), B(t) =
∑N
i=1 ciri(t). This type of equation
is used in structure models of credit where the company is assumed to default
if W falls below a given threshold [13,14]. Although the major problem with
this approach is obviously that W is not observable, we shall let aside such
considerations, as our point here is to show the existence of a minority mecha-
nism. Assume that each bank has full liberty to fix its own interest rate. How
should it react to bad news (W < 0)? A decrease in the wealth means that
the company is more likely to default in the future, hence the banks usually
tend to increase their interest rate. But doing so, they also increase the risk
of default. Reversely, if a bank decreases its interest rate when W decreases
and increases it when W increases, it rewards interest rate ri according to
ri
W (t+ 1)−W (t)
W (t)
= bi∆(t)−
ri
∑N
j=1 rj(t)cj
W (t)
(9)
The term −ri ∑j ricj reveals a minority mechanism; conversely, usual banks
play a majority game. The resource level is implicitly fixed by the condition
of zero average wealth change 〈∆〉W = 〈∑i rici〉. This means that as long as
the players can learn this resource level, W will oscillate around an average
value. As a consequence, the company is not likely to go bankrupt, but cannot
grow either: minority players are good for the company when it does badly,
but bad when it does relatively well; when the company does very well, that
is, when 〈∆〉W ≫ 〈∑i rici〉, the minority-player banks ask for the maximum
rate, but credit repayment has a negligible importance, hence the company
can grow. The competition between minority players is of the same kind as in
commodity markets: for them, it is tempting to ask for a larger interest rate
and hope that other banks ask for a small rate; on the other hand, if many
banks ask for too high a rate, some others have to lower their rate else the
risk of default is too high.
In conclusion, reviewing more and more complex situations with adaptive
agents leads to the conclusion that minority mechanisms are found when
some agents learn collectively a resource level, hidden or obvious, constant
in time or not, going beyond the usual belief that minority games capture
2 It is often assumed to be a Gaussian variable of average µ and variance σ for the
sake of simplicity.
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only competition for a scarce resource. Adaptive agents act so as to cancel
the average payoff, which defines the resource level implicitly, and leads to a
mean-reverting process. Although exact analytical methods used for the stan-
dard minority game can be extended to many simple extensions of the MG,
how far this can be done is an open question.
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